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Abstract
Standard explanatory variables that determine credit ratings do not achieve
significant effects in a sample of 100 US non-financial firms in an ordered probit
panel estimation. Sample size and selection as well as the distribution of ex-
planatory variables across rating classes may be the cause this problem. Fur-
thermore, we find evidence to suggest that variable coefficients vary over rating
classes when analysed with an unordered loogit model. The sample reproduces
well-established macroeconomic effects of credit ratings found by Blume et al.
(1998) and highlights the influence of the rating agencies’ through-the-cycle
approach on rating transitions.
Keywords: Rating agency; Business cycle; Through-the-cycle rating methodology; Method
comparison
JEL classification: G20; G24; G30; G32
1 Introduction
Credit Ratings represent the opinion of a rating agency that measures the funda-
mental creditworthiness of an entity (i.e. a corporation) and its ability to fully and
punctually meet its debt obligations (Gonzales et al. (2004)). The agencies’ that
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produce these ratings are professional organisations that must comply with regulat-
ory norms in the US and the EU (Hill (2004)). The agencies external ratings contrast
to internal or so-called ‘shadow ratings’ that banks develop to approve loans and
measure the riskiness of investments. In the case of corporations external ratings are
purchased by the issuers themselves1. Ratings are placed on a discrete ordinal scale,
where the so called ‘triple A’ (AAA) rating represents the highest rating assigned
to issuers with the highest credit quality.
In an economic sense rating agencies function as financial intermediaries, whose
existence would not be justified under the hypothesis of strictly efficient markets
(Ramakrishan & Thakor (1984)). The rating market itself is mainly controlled by
three agencies. These are Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), and Fitch, who
control around 95% of the market (Asmussen (2005), Wappenschmidt (2009), p.
13). The rating market can therefore be regarded as an oligopoly.
Issuers can use a rating as a mechanism of corporate governance to signal low
investment risk and transparency (Nordberg (2010)). Ratings can in this sense
reduce principal agent problems and thereby lessen a corporations capital costs
(Gonzales et al. (2004)). From an investors point of view, as a highly aggregated
classification of an issuers debt, ratings can inform a reader on the possibility that
an issuer will not be able to meet his debt obligations (Dilly & Mählmann (2010)).
The ratings can moreover be used by potential investors and banks as benchmarks
and reference point for their own analysis and internal ratings (Erlenmaier (2006)
p. 39).
Credit ratings and their movements are furthermore of empirical importance for
several reasons. They form the basis of a large part of regulation for institutional
investors (Hill (2004)). These investors can only purchase or hold bonds that have a
certain quality. Rating changes have a measured effect on the price of bonds (Katz
(1974)) and on stock prices (Jorion & Zhang (2007)) of a corporation. They are
furthermore employed in risk modeling (Nickel et al. (2000)). In this sense rating
transitions are relevant to determine the future development of the risk assessment
of a given portfolio.
1If they are solicited. Unsolicited ratings are rare and most ratings are solicited and withdrawn
at the firms request.
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Rating agencies insist that they apply a through-the-cycle approach to determine
the long-term credit worthiness independent of short-term business cycle effects
(Amato & Furfine (2004)). Yet, at least rating transitions do vary across the business
cycle (Nickel et al. (2000)). Rating transitions furthermore exhibit non-Markov
effects, i.e. the probability of of a rating transition is not only dependent on the
state it is in (Lando & Skødeberg (2002)). Transitions are shown to be dependent
on momentum (if an up- or downgrade occurred before) and duration (how long a
rating has been in a certain class) effects. These studies however do not employ firm
specific risk factors (Nickel et al. (2000) and Lando & Skødeberg (2002)).
Empirical papers on credit ratings can be roughly divided into three groups. In
the first group research focuses on the accuracy and predictive power of ratings.
These studies measure the correlation of ratings and future defaults to examine if
credit ratings present what rating agencies claim they present: a measurement of a
corporation’s creditworthiness. Studies by Zhou (2001) and Jorion & Zhang (2007)
show that over long term observations, i.e. around 10 years, the default accuracy
of ratings increases, i.e. higher rating classes have lower default frequencies, when
compared to one year default frequencies. Moreover, default rates do not increase
constantly. Rather the differences in default rates increase moving down the rating
scale.
The second group of studies measures the information content of credit ratings
and if ratings provide information which capital markets do not already incorporate.
They thereby test the efficient market hypothesis by analysing the market dynamics
of bond, stock, and CDS prices around rating events (for a review see Gonzales et
al. (2004)). Most studies find an asymmetric reaction of markets to rating changes.
Specifically, markets react stronger to downgrades than to upgrades (Jorion & Zhang
(2007)).
The third line of research analyses to which degree publicly available information
is reflected in the agencies’ judgement, or how accurately ratings can be reproduced
with public information. We find three main distinct groups of variables that determ-
ine credit ratings and credit rating changes: financial data and ratios (Ederington
(1985), Blume et al. (1998), and Altman & Rijken (2004)), corporate governance
characteristics (Bhojrai & Sengupta (2003), Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006), Jorion et
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al. (2009)), and macroeconomic factors (Nickel et al. (2000) and Amato & Furfine
(2004)).
Financial ratios are the basic determinants of credit ratings, as the relation of for
instance leverage and credit worthiness is intuitive. Different sets of these variables
are applied in most empirical applications (an exception is Nickel et al. (2000)) and
are necessary control variables to test the influence of other variable groups.
Corporate governance mechanisms can influence the credit worthiness in basic-
ally two ways. First, with respect to the principal agent problem between stock-
holders and management (Bhojrai & Sengupta (2003)). And second, through wealth
transfer effects from bondholders to shareholders (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006)).
Furthermore, Jorion et al. (2009) analyse the impact of changes in accounting qual-
ity on credit ratings.
Macroeconomic factors can either be reflected in changing agency standards
(Blume et al. (1998)) or through a dependence on the business cycle (Nickel et
al. (2000) and Amato & Furfine (2004)). At the time of this writing no study has to
our knowledge applied all three groups of variables. The only study that addresses
the interaction of all three groups is Jorion et al. (2009).
A large variety of empirical methods has been applied to credit rating estimation
and prediction. Ederington (1985) tests the performance of ordinary least squares
(OLS), multivariate discriminate analysis (MDA), ordered probit, and unordered
logit. Other studies apply machine learning methods, e.g. neuronal networks (e.g.
Dutta & Shekhar (1988)). Yet, in most economic and business studies the ordered
probit model has established itself as the dominant method.
The ordered probit model has two main advantages that relate to the specific
character of credit ratings. It can reflect the ordinal feature of credit ratings, i.e.
the difference of creditworthiness between two rating categories varies along the
rating scale. Second, the probit method can assume the ordered structure of the
ratings. A weakness of the ordered probit approach is that it implicitly assumes
that agencies apply a point-in-time perspective to credit ratings (Altman & Rijken
(2004)). Agencies however insist that they rate through-the-cycle and try to evaluate
the credit worthiness independent of short-term business cycle effects. Therefore a
probit approach is expected to predict more rating changes than are observed, as
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agencies try to achieve rating stability. To compensate for such effects some studies
employ duration and hazard methods to estimate rating changes (Du & Suo (2005)).
In the spirit of Blume et al. (1998), Amato & Furfine (2004), and Jorion et al.
(2009) we apply a panel ordered probit model to estimate the S&P ratings of the
100 largest US non-financial firms in 2005 in the time span from 1990 to 2009. We
reexamine their results with respect to the possible increasing stringency of rating
agencies standards (suggested by Blume et al. (1998)), the correlation with the
business cycle (Amato & Furfine (2004)), and an alternative explanations of the
findings of Blume et al. (1998) suggested by Jorion et al. (2009). Moreover, we
apply an OLS regression where the ratings are transfered into default probabilities
calculated by Jorion & Zhang (2007) to highlight the divergence of the through-the-
cycle and point-in-time perspective found by Altman & Rijken (2004) and Altman
& Rijken (2006).
The paper continues as follows: we present the rating distribution of our sample
in Section 2. Section 3 presents the financial and macroeconomic explanatory vari-
ables used in this study to determine credit ratings and their sample properties. In
Section 4 we discuss the statistical methods used in our study and their specific
properties. The empirical results are presented and discussed in Sections 5 to 7. In
Section 5 the stability of coefficients assumed in the ordered probit model is ana-
lysed. Section 6 reexamines the results of Blume et. al (1998) and Amato & Furfine
(2004) with respect to the increasing stringency of rating agencies and procyclical
properties of credit ratings respectively. In Section 7 we analyse the effects of the
through-the-cycle approach on rating stability. Section 8 concludes.
2 Ratings
Ratings range from AAA assigned to firms with the highest debt quality to D, which
is given to firms in default. Ratings from AA to CCC can furthermore have a ’+’
or a ’-’ that indicate more subtle differences in creditworthiness. Ratings from AAA
to BBB- are considered investment grade ratings, while BB+ and lower ratings are
called speculative ratings. The difference between BBB- and BB+ is important,
as for instance institutional investors may not purchase bonds rated BB+ or lower
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(Hill (2004)). For the purpose of estimation, we group all AA, A, BBB, BB, B, and
CCC, CC, and D ratings together so we have K = 7 rating categories.
The encoding for each rating category and its 10 year default frequency calculated
by Jorion & Zhang (2007) are depicted in Table 1. Noticeably, the differences
in default frequencies increase down the rating scale. For instance, the difference
between BBB- and BB+ of just one notch is larger than the difference from AAA
to AA- of four notches.
For the purpose of this study we collect S&P foreign long term issuer ratings from
1990 to 20092. The sample excludes banks and other financial firms in contrast to
Blume et al. (1998) and Amato & Furfine (2004)3. The sample comprises the 100
largest US non financial publicly tradable stock companies of 2005.
Table 2 depicts the distribution of rating classes of our sample across time. In
comparison to Amato & Furfine (2004) there are comparatively fewer lower rated
firms. This could be caused by the sample selection. As seen below in Section 3
larger firms have ceteris paribus better ratings4. Therefore the choice of the 100
largest firms in 2005 might result in fever lower rated firms.
3 Explanatory variables
Credit ratings are determined by basically three different groups of variables. The
first are financial data and ratios that measure factors such as leverage, liquidity,
and profitability (see e.g. Blumen et al. (1998)). The second group covers corpor-
ate governance characteristics. Studies that employ corporate governance charac-
teristics aim to measure the effects of corporate governance mechanisms on credit
ratings that influence principal agent problems between management and stockhold-
ers (Bhojrai & Sengupta (2003)) and the redistribution of wealth from bondholders
to shareholders (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006)). The third group comprises mac-
2Issuer and issue ratings can have different determinants. A issue rating determines the cred-
itworthiness of one specific obligation, while the issuer rating reflects the firms creditworthiness in
general.
3This distinction may lead to different empirical results, as financial companies have different
capital structures.
4Jorion et al. (2009) note that in their sample on average investment firms are nine times as
large as speculative firms.
6
roeconomic variables that measure business-cycle effects and fundamental changes.
Rating agencies insist that they employ a through-the-cycle approach that estimates
the long term credit worthiness of a firm independent of short term business cycle-
effects. Nevertheless, credit ratings are found to correlate with the business-cycle
(Amato & Furfine (2004) and Nickel et al. (2000)).
In this study we employ 10 variables extracted from financial statements that
fall into the first category. Following Blume et al. (1998) we use pretax interest
coverage, operating income to sales, a long term debt ratio, a total debt ratio, and
total assets. Furthermore, we employ 2 ratios suggested by Altman (1968) to predict
corporate bankruptcy and later used in credit rating studies by Altman & Rijken
(2004) and Kim & Sohn (2008). These ratios are the retained earnings to total
assets, the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total assets, and sales to
total assets. The list is concluded by the return on assets ratio. For both the ROA
and the total debt-total assets ratio we include a five year average.
3.1 Definitions and possible effects
Specifically, pretax interest coverage (IC) is operating income after depreciation
plus interest expenses divided by interest expenses. Operating income should be
positively related to ratings. More specifically, a decline in interest expenses should
improve ratings if operating income after depreciation is positive. Blume et al.
(1998) highlight the non-linear influence of interest coverage, i.e. for small values of
interest coverage changes are relevant while for large values changes become neg-
ligible. Furthermore, negative values are not meaningful as a negative operating
income and a decline in interest expenses would cause a positive development at the
margin although the variable would become negative (Amato & Furfine (2004)).
The operating income to sales ratio (OI NS)is defined as operating income before
depreciation divided by net sales. This ratio is a proxy of both earnings and cash
flow. A firm’s earnings margin indicates if it can generate the necessary cash to
service its debt obligations. Moreover, the value of a firm’s assets are measured by
its earnings.
The long term debt ratio (LTD/TA) and the total debt ratio (TD/TA) are both
measures of leverage. They are respectively defined as long term debt divided by
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total assets and the sum of long term debt, debt in current liabilities, and short
term debt divided by total assets. Issuer ratings measure a firm’s ability to serve
all its financial responsibilities but are also linked to the issue rating of unsecured
long-term debt. Therefore, a distinction between long-term debt and total debt
seems appropriate to measure the magnitude of a firm’s debt obligations (Amato &
Furfine (2004)). Both ratios should be negatively related to credit ratings.
Amato & Furfine (2004) consider firm size (TA) to be a measure of business
risk. Larger firms tend to be older and have more diversified product lines and
a higher variety of revenues 5. Therefore firm size should be positively related to
credit ratings. Blume et al. (1998) furthermore find that financial ratios are more
informative for larger firms by modelling the residual variance as a function of firm
size. This result implies that variables for larger firms are more stable over time or
alternatively that relevant variables are missing in their analysis6.
In the spirit of Altman’s (1968) default prediction model, Altman & Rijken
(2004), and Kim & Sohn (2008) we furthermore include a retained earnings to total
assets ratio (RE/TA). This ratio proxies the historic profitability of a firm, and
furthermore implicitly measures the age of a firm, as older firms usually have a
higher retained earnings total assets ratio. The retained earnings can be used in less
profitable times to ensure the service of obligations and should therefore be positively
related to credit ratings. Indeed Kim & Sohn (2008) find that the retained earnings
total assets ratio is strongly related to future upgrades.
Similarly, the earnings before interests and taxes to total assets (EBIT/TA) is
a proxy of the firm’s current profitability (Altman & Rijken (2004)). It measures
the true productivity of a firm’s assets (Altman (1968)). A core element of a firm’s
existence including its creditworthiness is based on the earnings power of its assets.
This ratio should therefore be positively related to credit ratings.
Return on assets (ROA) is a further measure of profitability. For individual firms
the proxy of profitability used by the rating agency may differ. Furthermore, we
include the five year arithmetic average of ROA (ROA 5yr) to test if we can thereby
5For similar reasons Altman & Rijken (2004) use firm age as a determinant.
6Firm size measured by total assets is deflated using a CPI taken from the US Department of
Labour form the 2011.04.15 downloaded 2011.04.28: ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.request/
cpi/cpiai.txt . Then the natural logarithm is taken.
8
capture changes in the fundamental creditworthiness of firms.
Some studies (e.g. Blume et al. (1998), Bhoiraj & Sengupta (2003), and Amato
& Furfine (2004)) use market based measures of risk, i.e. the market β, as further
determinant of credit ratings. Yet, as can be seen in Bhoiraj & Sengupta (2003), the
measured relationship between β and credit ratings varies if different characteristics
of corporate governance are used. This suggests that the effect of market based
measures and credit ratings is not yet fully understood. We therefore omit these
variables from our analysis.
Amato & Furfine (2004) use three measures of the business cycle in their study
to test the procyclicality of credit ratings: The NBER recession indicator, the real
and potential GDP output gap, and a discrete measure of that same output gap.
Here, we only employ the actual GDP output gap (GDP GAP), as it is the only
business cycle measure with a significant impact in Amato & Furfine (2004) study.
As the GDP growth gap is positively correlated with real GDP, GDP GAP should
be positively related to credit ratings7.
3.2 Sample properties
In Table 2 The mean values of the explanatory variables are given for each rating
class and the not rated firms (NR). There seem to be no apparent trends for IC
and EBIT/TA. The means of OI NS increase down the rating scale. Because of this
feature we might not be able to detect a positive relationship between OI NS and
credit ratings, despite the fact that this is documented in other studies (e.g. Blume
et al. (1998)). The TA variable shows a slight downward trend that indicates
the expected positive relationship. This can be also said about ROA and ROA
5yr. Except for CCC a downward trend can also be seen in RE TA. The measures
for leverage LTD/TA, TD/TA, and TD/TA 5yr appear to be U-shaped. Overall,
the distributions of the explanatory variables might cause difficulties to measure
significant effects.
The sample selection criteria might cause the firms to be too similar with respect
7The GDP output gap can be downloaded from http:\\www.imf.org.
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to their capital structure, so that other firm specific factors may help to determine
differences in creditworthiness. Macroeconomic factors must be ruled out, as they
effect all firms equally. Yet, differences in corporate governance characteristics like
those employed by Bhoiraj & Sengupta (2003) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006)
could be more adequate.
In Figure 1 the correlation of GDP GAP and the ratio of up- and downgrades
from 1990 to 2009. Note that the ratio of up- and downgrades can not go below
zero, and therefore it can not follow the GDP GAP in 2009 but converges towards
zero. As in Amato & Furfine (2004) there appears to be a positive correlation of
rating transitions and the business cycle.
4 Statistical methods applied
It is standard to use an ordered probit model to estimate and predict credit ratings
(Blume et al. (1998), Amato & Furfine (2004)). An extensive method compar-
ison is given by Ederington (1985). Here ordinary least squares (OLS) regression,
multivariate discriminant analysis (MDA), unordered logit, and ordered probit are
compared.
As mentioned above, the rating scale has specific features that can be best
exploited by an ordered probit model, more specifically, an ordered probit panel
approach for cross sectional time series analysis. Furthermore, ratings are also es-
timated with an unordered logit panel model, and using the corresponding default
frequencies estimated by Jorion & Zhang (2007) in an OLS regression. The un-
ordered logit model tests the assumption that effects are constant over all rating
classes made by the ordered probit approach. The default frequency approach tests
the effect of the agencies’ through-the-cycle approach as it implies a stronger point-
in-time perspective.
4.1 Ordered probit estimation
The ordered probit approach is the established method used in most studies meas-
uring the determinants of credit ratings (e.g. Blume et al. (1998), Amato & Furfine
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(2004), and Jorion et al. (2009)). Altman & Rijken (2004) use an ordered logit
model, which does not differ much in application or result8.
The ordered probit approach regresses the observed discrete rating categories
on explanatory variables by an unobserved continuous variable that underlies the
ratings. Partitioning the range of the unobserved variable then sorts it into the
discrete categories. The unobserved variable is a linear function of the observed
explanatory variables. We define the unobserved variable as the likelihood of not
defaulting.
The ratings of firm n at the end of year t is denoted as Rn,t and encoded as
7 for AAA till 1 for CCC+ and below. Then yn,t is the unobservable variable
likelihood of not defaulting or creditworthiness that underlies the Rn,t, for which µk
for k = 1, . . . , K − 1 are the partition points independent of n and t. The fixed
effects panel model for yn,t is then:
yn,t = αt +Xn,tβ
′ + εn,t, (1)
where αt is the intercept for year t, β is a p× 1 vector of coefficients, Xn,t is a 1× p
vector of the n-th firm’s specific risk factors in year t, and εn,t is a Gaussian error
term.
The most probable rating category for any observation given Xn,t is then the
estimated ŷn,t:
Pr(Rn,t = k|θ) =

Pr(ŷn,t ≥ µ6|θ) for k = 7
Pr(µk > ŷn,t ≥ µk−1|θ) for k = 6, . . . , 2
Pr(µ1 > ŷn,t|θ) for k = 1.
4.2 Unordered logit
Alternatively, Ederington (1985) suggest an unordered logit to estimate credit rat-
ings. Both methods are able to incorporate the ordinal structure of credit ratings.
They differ in the sense that the unordered logit can allow the coefficients of the
variables to differ over rating classes but it disregards the ordered structure of credit
8See Ederington (1985) for a more detailed discussion. The logit and probit method differ in the
error distribution. The probit approach assumes a Gaussian distribution while the logit assumes
a logistic distribution.
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ratings. The choice between ordered probit and unordered logit is one between
structure and flexibility (Ederington (1985)). We can therefore use an unordered
logit model to test the stability of the determinants of the coefficients. The results of
Ederington (1985) do indeed suggest that coefficients vary over rating classes. Yet,
the flexibility reduces the predictive power compared to an ordered approach.
The unordered logit is mostly constructed like the ordered probit with the ex-
ception that a logit estimation assumes a logistic distribution for the error terms
εn,t.
4.3 Employing default rates
Furthermore, the ratings can be translated into corresponding default rates Dk es-
timated by Jorion & Zhang (2007). Then, 1 − Dk presents the likelihood of not
defaulting. Taking as unobserved variable the probit of this likelihood, we can do an
OLS regression on this. We can then use the arithmetic half-way distances between
the default frequencies as thresholds in order to assign the estimated likelihood of
not defaulting values to credit ratings.
Using default frequencies, Jorion & Zhang (2007) could show that price-adjustment
processes can be better explained if they are conditioned on the prior rating9. Simil-
arly, if credit ratings behaved like other default measures that employ a more point-
in-time perspective such as Merton-type methods, this approach should improve
rating prediction. Yet, agencies insist that they use a through-the-cycle approach.
This is motivated so as to ensure a degree of rating stability (Altman & Rijken
(2006)). Therefore, the default measure approach should produce a rating trans-
ition matrix with larger transition probabilities (Altman & Rijken (2004) and Kim
& Sohn (2008)). The transition frequencies of this method should therefore pro-
duce an upper bound and the actual rating transition matrix a lower bound for the
purpose of model evaluation. The estimated transition probabilities of an ordered
probit or an unordered logit should lie between these values.
9Prior research had failed to find significant price reactions after upgrades.
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5 Coefficient stability
We first analyse our results with respect to the stability of the determining variables,
thereby testing the underlying assumption of the ordered probit panel fixed effects
model that the coefficients are constant over time and rating classes. To test the
stability over rating classes we compare the ordered probit results with an unordered
logit regression. Furthermore, we test the stability of the coefficients over time by
performing yearly probit regressions.
5.1 Ordered probit panel
In Table 4 the results of four different ordered probit panel regressions are dis-
played10. First, they are used unmodified in the ‘naive’ regression. The second
regression ‘AV’ tests if fundamental changes in creditworthiness can be captured by
subtracting the current TD/TA, and ROA ratios from their respective five year av-
erages. We then follow Blume et al. (1998) and allow IC to have a non linear effect
in ‘IC AV’11. In the last regression we only include the five year averages of TD/TA
and ROA and omit their current values. This approach proxies other studies that
use three year averages (Blume et al. (1998) and Amato & Furfine (2004)).
In comparison to the results of other studies both interest coverage and operating
income to net sales have the opposite impact. Moreover, interest coverage has no
significant effect even after allowing for non linear effects.
The three measures of leverage have no significant effect if they are all used
in a regression. Yet, when we omit for instance TD/TA and its five year aver-
age, LTD/TA has the expected significant negative effect. Subtracting the current
TD/TA from its five year average does not seem able to capture a fundamental
change in the creditworthiness, as its coefficient is not significant nor does it have
the expected negative sign. The insignificance and varying impact might be caused
by multicollinearity within the variables12.
10Only the coefficients of the variables are shown. The yearly constants are discussed in detail
in Section 6 below.
11In contrast to Blume et al. (1998) we only partition IC into three variables, as there are no
IC > 20. For more details see Blume et al. (1998).
12Amato & Furfine (2004) suggest this to explain the non significant effect of TD/TA in their
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The impact of profitability measures that determine credit ratings depend on the
set of estimators used in each regression. The most stable effect is caused by ROA,
while other measures like EBIT/TA might even have a negative impact. ALtman
& Rijken (2004) interpret some measures as proxies for past, present, and future
profitability. Moreover, agencies might select which measure is most important in
their assessment depending on the firm’s circumstances. In contrast to Blume et al.
(1998) measures of profitability often fail to have a significant impact. As noted in
Section 3 this might be caused by small variation of the explanatory variables across
rating classes compared to other studies.
Firm size measured by has a constant significant positive effect independent of
further variable selection. It is also in this sample an important measure of the
creditworthiness of firms.
5.2 Stability over rating classes
We next test the assumption that effects over rating classes are constant. For this
purpose we analyse the results of an unordered logit panel estimation. Table 5
presents the coefficient results of this estimation13. Here the K − 1 groups of coeffi-
cients determining ratings between all rating classes.
As in the ordered probit estimation interest coverage has no significant coeffi-
cients. The OI/NS and TA variables have the same stable significant effects as in
the ordered probit estimations. In contrast to the probit estimations the measures
for leverage have significant effects, although not for lower rating classes. Across all
rating classes except for CCC to B at least one measure has a significant effect.
Except for ROA 5yr, the proxies for profitability have significant effects over
almost all rating classes. The coefficients of the retained earnings ratio and ROA
are both positive. The EBIT ratio has an unexpected negative effect like OI NS.
The results of Ederington (1985) indicate that coefficients might not necessarily
be constant over rating classes. Yet, in studies such as Blume et al. (1998) and
Jorion et al. (2009) the variables have stable significant effects. In our sample a
study.
13As above for the ordered probit panel estimation, we discuss the results of the constants in
detail in Section 6.
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functional coefficient model might solve the problem posed by the variation of effects
across rating classes. Moreover Blume et al. (1998) show that financial ratios are
more informative for larger firms than for smaller ones. Furthermore, Bhojrai &
Sengupta (2003) find that corporate governance characteristics are have a larger
effect for lower rated firms. These two findings fit neatly together, as larger firms
are on average better rated. This is compatible with the results in Table 5, where
there are fewer significant coefficients for lower rating classes14. Therefore, the factor
determining the coefficients of credit rating determinants might be firm size.
5.3 Stability over time
In order to test the assumption of the fixed effects approach that coefficients are
constant over time we perform yearly ordered probit regressions independent of
each other. Table 6 displays the results of these estimations.
We find that except for TA almost no variable has a significant effect in any given
year. This further highlights the importance of firm size in the agencies’ assessment
of a firm’s creditworthiness. As the sample size and variation in the panel probit
approach might be too small to produce significant results, the situation for a year
by year analysis is even more difficult15.
Overall, we note that the sample size and variable variation within the sample
might be too small and selective to capture significant effects observed in other
studies. Allowing coefficients to vary across rating classes solves this dilemma to a
certain degree.
6 Macroeconomic effects
The procyclicality of credit ratings is empirically observed although rating agencies
apply a through-the-cycle approach. Therefore, using a measure of the business cycle
as a control variable seems appropriate, when discussing the results of Blume et al.
(1998) who suggest that the decreasing constants of the fixed effects panel model
indicate that agencies standards have become more stringent over time. Jorion et
14There are also less observations in these rating classes, which might cause this result.
15This finding does not change if different subsets of the variables are used.
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al. (2009) argue that this effect disappears if a firm specific measure for accounting
quality is used. More specifically, accounting quality of investment grade firms seems
to have declined over time.
We analyse the evolution of ordered probit panel constants from the ‘IC AV’
model in Section 5 to compare the properties of our sample with the results of
Blume et al. (1998), Amato & Furfine (2004), and Jorion et al. (2009). The
development of the six groups of constants from the unordered logit estimation are
shown in Section 5 and compared with the findings of Jorion et al. (2009) that
the constants only had a negative trend for speculative ratings. Last, we measure
the influence of a business cycle measure both for a ordered logit model and an
unordered logit estimation in the spirit of Amato & Furfine (2004), who found that
investment ratings were more sensitive to business cycle effects.
6.1 Yearly constants
The yearly constants of the ‘naive’ regression are displayed in Table 7. The dummies
show a negative trend and decrease in time from zero16, set in 1990, and become
significantly negative. Figure 2 displays the evolution of the dummy variables of our
sample along with the results of Blume et al. (1998), Amato & Furfine (2004), and
Jorion et al. (2009). The yearly dummies show a similar trend to those of the other
studies.
The sample of Blume et al. (1998) contains only investment grade ratings, while
Amato & Furfine (2004) and Jorion et al. (2009) also include speculative ratings.
Moreover, Jorion et al. (2009) perform two distinct estimations for investment and
speculative ratings. Our yearly constants behave similar to the investment grade
estimation of Jorion et al. (2009). This result can be expected as our sample contains
more investment grade ratings by comparison to Amato & Furfine (2004).
Notably, Blume et al. (1998) interpreted the negative trend in the yearly dum-
mies as evidence that agencies’ standards have become more stringent. They show
that the coefficients of the explanatory variables are stable over time17. They there-
fore argue that the negative trend is evidence that agencies have become more
16Each study sets the first year dummy to zero.
17This is tested using a random effects model. The main results stem from a fixed effects model.
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critical in assessing the creditworthiness of firms. Furthermore, Amato & Furfine
(2004) show that these results are robust to the inclusion of measures of the business
cycle.
Blume et al. (1998) dismiss the critique that the trend might indicate the devel-
opment of factors which were omitted from their study, by arguing that the liter-
ature did not suggest further important determinants of credit ratings at the time.
Yet, since then Bhojrai & Sengupta (2003) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) have
shown that credit ratings are also dependent on corporate governance characterist-
ics. Nevertheless, neither study addresses a possible impact of corporate governance
mechanisms on rating stability.
Jorion et al. (2009) provide an alternative interpretation to the negative trend.
Rating agencies are dependent on the information provided by the firms themselves,
as the agencies do not themselves collect data, their assessment is critically reliant
on the quality of the firm’s accounting data (Hill (2004)). Jorion et al. (2009)
first show that the negative trend is restricted to investment grade ratings (see
Figure 2). Furthermore, after including a measure of firm specific accounting quality
the negative trend disappears. They therefore attribute the observed decline to
changes in accounting quality.
In Table 8 the constants of the unordered logit estimation are displayed. Yet,
contrary to the results of Jorion et al. (2009) we find no apparent negative trend for
higher rating classes. Moreover, a negative trend is found for CCC to B, implying
the exact opposite of the Jorion et al. (2009) results. Yet, as already mentioned
our sample contains fewer lower rated firms and therefore our results might not be
representative.
6.2 Procyclicality of credit ratings
We test the dependence of our sample on macroeconomic trends by including a
measure of the business cycle (GDP GAP) in an ordered probit and an unordered
logit estimation. Here, the yearly constants are replaced by a trend variable that is
t for the respective year. With the unordered logit estimation we test the Amato &
Furfine (2004) finding that investment grade firms are more sensitive to the business
cycle. This finding is somewhat counterintuitive, as agencies stress that in particular
17
the default of CCC rated firms is highly dependent on the economic situation18.
Furthermore, Nickel et al. (2000) find that at least the transition frequencies of
lower rated firms are more sensitive to the business cycle.
In Table 9 the results of the ordered probit estimation with a trend variable
and GDP GAP are displayed using the ‘naive’ set of variables. We find that the
effects and significance of firm specific variables does not change substantially in
comparison to the estimation in Section 5. The trend variable has a negative effect,
which can be expected given the downward trend of the yearly constants. As in
Amato & Furfine (2004) the downward trend is positively related to credit ratings.
Table 10 shows the results of an equivalent unordered logit estimation. Similarly,
the coefficients do not change compared to those of the estimation in Section 5. The
trend has a negative impact over all rating classes. Yet, the effect of the business
cycle varies. It is insignificant for investment ratings, while speculative ratings are
positively related to it. This is the opposite finding of Amato & Furfine (2004), yet
restricted to our subsample.
Overall, the results indicate that with respect to yearly constants and business
cycle measures the sample has similar features as those of other studies using larger
samples. Furthermore, an unordered logit suggests that speculative firms are more
sensitive to the business cycle.
7 Rating stability
Rating stability is an objective of rating agencies along with accuracy and timeli-
ness. The stability objective is expressed in the agencies’ through-the-cycle approach
(Altman & Rijken (2006)). Altman & Rijken (2006) highlight the consequences of
this approach on rating transitions. Altman & Rijken (2004) and Altman & Rijken
(2006) results indicate that ratings are more stable than measures from a more point-
in-time perspective. Rating transitions play an important role in risk management
as they reflect the riskiness of a given portfolio. In this respect the estimation and
prediction of transition probabilities is highly important.
18See Standard & Poor’s Rating Definition, www.standardandpoors.com/ratingdirect.
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We compare rating transitions probabilities estimated from actual ratings in the
sample with the probabilities of the ordered probit approach and the OLS estimation
using default rates. Furthermore, we compare our sample results with those of Nickel
et al. (2000)19.
Nickel et al. (2000) estimate rating transitions from a Markov perspective condi-
tioned solely on the current rating class. Other studies show that rating transitions
are also dependent on non-Markov effects, i.e. duration and momentum (Lando &
Skødeberg (2002) and Du & Suo (2005)). In this application we ignore possible
Non-Markov effects and follow Nickel et al. (2000) using transition frequencies to
estimate transition probabilities. This is appropriate as we use the estimated trans-
ition matrices to evaluate our methods with regard to rating stability.
The three transition matrices are shown in Table 11. Transition probabilities pij
reflecting the probability of rating in category i in year t to change to category j in
t+1 are estimated by dividing the sum of firms that are in rating category i in year
t and transition to category j in t + 1 by the sum of all firms in category i in year
t20.
In comparison to Nickel et al. (2000) we find that there are fewer lower rated
firms in our sample. As a consequence the transition probabilities for lower rated
firms are not as stable. For CCC ratings there are more transitions out of the rating
class than stay in there. Consequently rating transition probabilities from the actual
ratings should be considered inaccurate for this rating class.
The transition matrices designed using the ordered probit estimation and OLS
regression using default rates highlight a problem that might be caused by the sample
selection. There are no estimated ratings in the highest and lowest rating categories.
Nevertheless, the transition probabilities of the ordered probit estimation are higher
than the actual transition frequencies and lower than those estimated from the OLS
regression, thus confirming the results of Altman & Rijken (2004).
This result has important implications for risk management. The risk of a port-
folio needs to be interpreted differently if different measures of creditworthiness are
used, in particular point-in-time measures (Merton-type models) and through-the-
19Nickel et al. (2000) use Moody’s ratings, but nevertheless set a benchmark study.




This study analyses the statistical properties and stability of ratings from a sample
made up of the 100 largest US-non-financial firms in 2005. We perform an ordered
probit panel estimation, an unordered logit, and an OLS regression using default
frequencies of the respective rating categories.
The sample is possibly too small and selectively chosen to find significant effects
of standard explanatory variables. This is emphasised by the small variation and
sometimes counter-intuitive trends in the variable distributions across rating classes.
Indeed, in multiple ordered probit estimations some variables fail to have a significant
effect or even have the opposite sign that other studies find. In an unordered logit
estimation some of these variables are found to have a significant effect, suggesting
that coefficients vary across rating classes.
The macroeconomic properties of the sample are consistent with the findings
of larger studies. An unordered logit estimation suggest that lower rated firms are
more sensitive to the business cycle. The transition probabilities estimated by the
OLS regression using default rates highlight the through-the-cycle approach of the
rating agencies. Point-in-time perspective measures tend to vary stronger over time
than agencies’ credit ratings.
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Time period 1981 – 2002
Table 1: Default frequencies of rating categories of Standard & Poor’s (Source Jorion
& Zhang (2007)) and classification.
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Rating Distribution
AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC–CC D NR
1990 6 13 19 3 6 3 0 0 50
1991 6 12 21 8 6 3 0 0 44
1992 8 13 25 8 8 3 0 0 35
1993 8 13 26 8 11 1 0 0 33
1994 7 14 26 10 10 1 0 0 32
1995 7 13 28 14 10 0 0 0 28
1996 7 15 28 15 8 1 0 0 26
1997 7 16 29 20 4 1 0 0 23
1998 7 17 31 23 2 0 0 0 20
1999 8 15 31 26 6 0 0 0 14
2000 8 15 32 29 5 1 0 0 10
2001 7 14 30 33 10 1 0 0 5
2002 6 12 32 34 10 1 0 1 4
2003 6 11 32 36 10 2 0 1 2
2004 5 10 31 37 8 4 1 1 3
2005 5 9 34 34 7 5 0 3 3
2006 5 8 35 35 5 8 0 1 3
2007 5 7 35 36 4 9 0 0 4
2008 5 8 34 33 7 6 3 0 4
2009 3 10 32 32 9 6 0 3 5



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CCC to B B to BB BB to BBB BBB to A A to AA AA to AAA
IC 0.0823 0.0566 -0.1655 -0.2548 0.0389 0.0113
(P-Value) (0.8715) (0.8467) (0.4847) (0.1985) (0.8358) (0.9609)
OI/NS -12.8299 -10.1826 -10.2069 -9.8713 -3.8397 -9.3131
(P-Value) (0.0209) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0507) (0.0000)
LTD/TA -0.3333 3.5859 5.5244 8.1619 7.4600 4.4874
(P-Value) (0.9555) (0.3084) (0.0379) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0773)
TD/TA -7.2242 2.4354 -5.8698 -9.6921 -6.8820 -5.1386
(P-Value) (0.3563) (0.5633) (0.0639) (0.0003) (0.0076) (0.0783)
TD/TA 5yr 2.6164 -6.8704 2.2258 5.8078 4.3859 5.8671
(P-Value) (0.6953) (0.0660) (0.4355) (0.0170) (0.0632) (0.0265)
TA 1.5901 0.9735 1.3536 1.2032 0.8198 0.8593
(P-Value) (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
RE/TA 0.0893 3.1275 2.4272 3.4240 3.3722 2.9333
(P-Value) (0.9543) (0.0022) (0.0081) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0005)
EBIT/TA -28.5914 -9.1570 -14.4826 -15.8840 -16.5548 -16.5900
(P-Value) (0.0070) (0.1026) (0.0018) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
ROA 32.5919 12.9980 17.4583 18.4062 18.7548 19.8828
(P-Value) (0.0017) (0.0446) (0.0013) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
ROA 5yr 13.0370 1.2359 -2.2200 -7.6235 -9.7167 -0.4913
(P-Value) (0.3216) (0.8624) (0.7061) (0.1303) (0.0494) (0.9266)
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1990 0 - -
1991 -0.2677 -1.1414 0.2537
1992 -0.1891 -0.8303 0.4064
1993 -0.1953 -0.8718 0.3833
1994 -0.2065 -0.9299 0.3524
1995 -0.2614 -1.1913 0.2335
1996 -0.3148 -1.4395 0.1500
1997 -0.2802 -1.3039 0.1923
1998 -0.2485 -1.1639 0.2445
1999 -0.4049 -1.9047 0.0568
2000 -0.4866 -2.3170 0.0205
2001 -0.7312 -3.4911 0.0005
2002 -0.8019 -3.8150 0.0001
2003 -0.9083 -4.3047 0.0000
2004 -1.0138 -4.7606 0.0000
2005 -1.0481 -4.8924 0.0000
2006 -1.0492 -4.8919 0.0000
2007 -1.0645 -4.9584 0.0000
2008 -1.0677 -4.9953 0.0000
2009 -1.1993 -5.5041 0.0000
Table 7: Year dummies of the ‘naive’ probit panel estimation from 1990 – 2009,
where 1990 is set to zero.
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Year dummies
CCC to B B to BB BB to BBB BBB to A A to AA AA to AAA
1991 -0.8468 -0.4262 -0.2824 -1.3297 -0.1430 0.0729
1992 0.3841 0.5214 -0.1815 -0.9011 0.0835 0.6108
1993 1.2416 1.0543 -0.7682 -1.1320 -0.4507 0.1786
1994 -1.5971 1.2979 -0.8039 -1.4907 -0.5857 -0.1449
1995 -1.6026 18.5677 -0.9276 -2.1042 -0.7323 -0.1552
1995 -2.4106 1.0642 -0.8585 -2.3668 -0.9284 -0.3153
1997 -2.3791 0.8809 -0.4532 -2.5066 -0.8947 -0.4035
1998 -2.9691 17.9993 0.0307 -2.7648 -1.0473 -0.7623
1999 -3.3107 17.5809 -1.1586 -3.0932 -1.1604 -0.8601
2000 -3.5395 0.2622 -1.0928 -3.1762 -1.0581 -0.7214
2001 -3.8885 -0.3507 -2.4290 -3.9264 -1.5412 -1.2567
2002 -21.1118 -0.4289 -2.5937 -4.1669 -1.8275 -1.1612
2003 -21.7130 -1.1403 -2.8907 -4.5767 -2.1102 -1.3213
2004 -22.6225 -1.9319 -2.9231 -4.8310 -2.3100 -1.4053
2005 -23.4686 -1.8635 -2.8424 -4.8163 -2.4388 -1.2841
2006 -22.5297 -2.8033 -2.5033 -5.0326 -2.5929 -1.4514
2007 -5.3292 -3.1067 -2.2894 -5.0279 -2.6160 -1.3363
2008 -23.0149 -3.1024 -2.7721 -4.7915 -2.5191 -1.3976
2009 -24.3328 -4.1453 -4.2540 -6.1777 -3.6652 -2.9052
Table 8: Yearly dummies of the unordered Logit estimation with the ‘naive’ vari-
ables.











ROA 5yr -0.1720 0.8637
GDP GAP 0.0268 0.0881
Trend -0.0630 0.0000
Table 9: Ordered probit estimation with macro economic factors.
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CCC to B B to BB BB to BBB BBB to A A to AA AA to AAA
IC 0.2149 -0.0589 -0.1138 -0.2039 0.0413 0.0112
(P-Value) (0.6741) (0.8377) (0.6315) (0.2861) (0.8248) (0.9611)
OI/NS -10.4070 -10.4479 -9.7724 -9.5846 -3.8537 -9.0916
(P-Value) (0.0487) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0478) (0.0000)
LTD/TA -0.7915 3.2867 5.2405 7.8009 7.3421 4.2447
(P-Value) (0.8943) (0.3453) (0.0466) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0909)
TD/TA -3.9357 1.6725 -5.4527 -9.1201 -6.8234 -5.5397
(P-Value) (0.5899) (0.6763) (0.0775) (0.0005) (0.0072) (0.0538)
TD/TA 5yr 0.0200 -5.5717 1.9897 5.5283 4.5220 6.4449
(P-Value) (0.9974) (0.1042) (0.4725) (0.0201) (0.0505) (0.0128)
TA 1.4031 1.0019 1.3097 1.1694 0.8081 0.8480
(P-Value) (0.0020) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
RE/TA 0.0728 3.0050 2.5079 3.4723 3.3711 2.9812
(P-Value) (0.9626) (0.0034) (0.0055) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0004)
EBIT/TA -25.7464 -8.1922 -14.2694 -15.5789 -16.5014 -16.0135
(P-Value) (0.0095) (0.1446) (0.0018) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
ROA 30.3274 12.1664 17.3162 18.0119 18.1659 18.8900
(P-Value) (0.0035) (0.0529) (0.0011) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
ROA 5yr 11.8043 1.2037 -2.4726 -7.5693 -8.8605 -0.5576
(P-Value) (0.3068) (0.8623) (0.6611) (0.1173) (0.0613) (0.9136)
GDP GAP -0.0049 0.1931 0.1833 0.0352 0.0830 0.0552
(P-Value) (0.9775) (0.0508) (0.0265) (0.6190) (0.2287) (0.4802)
Trend -0.5486 -0.2754 -0.1789 -0.2673 -0.1686 -0.1224
(P-Value) (0.0000) (0.0000) ( 0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)



















































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Correlation of the real GDP output gap and the ratio of up- and down
grades in this sample.
Figure 2: Evolution of probit constants over time from different studies. BLM:
Blume et al. (1998), AF: Amato & Furfine (2004), JSZ INVEST: Probit regression
for investment grade ratings of Jorion et al. (2009), JSZ SPEC: Probit regression
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